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Food with Integrity?:  How Responsible 
Corporate Officer Prosecutions Under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Deny 
Fair Warning to Corporate Officers∗ 
[W]hen it comes to food safety, we have to rely on the 
companies that manufacture and distribute food to ensure 
that the food we buy is safe.  In fact, most consumers give 
little thought to the safety of their food.  I know I don’t and 
I bet many of you don’t either.  We simply don’t expect to 
get sick from the food at our favorite restaurant, or from 
peanut butter or the eggs or the cantaloupes or the countless 
other products that we buy at the supermarket.  That is why 
food safety is a priority for the Justice Department.  Our 
role in protecting consumer safety is at its apex when 
consumers can least protect themselves.1 
From 2012 to 2015, Chipotle Mexican Grill (Chipotle) was 
widely regarded as the most popular restaurant in America in the 
fast, casual Mexican food category.2  Known for its fresh 
ingredients and promotion of environmental justice, the fast 
food restaurant chain rapidly became one of the most recognized 
∗	The author sincerely thanks Tiffany Murphy, Associate Professor of Law, University of 
Arkansas School of Law, for her thoughtful guidance throughout the drafting of this 
comment.  The author also thanks Susan Schneider, William H. Enfield Professor of Law, 
University of Arkansas School of Law, Madison Throneberry, family, and friends for 
providing insight into the topic of this Comment, as well as constant encouragement and 
moral support during the drafting process.
1. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the
Consumer Federation of America’s 39th Annual National Food Policy Conference (Apr. 6, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-
benjamin-c-mizer-delivers-remarks-consumer [https://perma.cc/9UHW-Q8E3]. 
2. See Hadley Malcolm, This Restaurant Just Unseated Chipotle as the Most
Popular Mexican Chain, USA TODAY (June 11, 2016, 7:06 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/06/09/moes-southwest-grill-most-popular-
mexican-chain/85640598/ [https://perma.cc/5WRJ-RRW9].  
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and trusted food brands in America.3  However, in 2015, 
Chipotle’s popularity plummeted nearly as quickly as its 
meteoric rise began.4  Notably, the restaurant’s signature burrito 
bowls and urban building designs had not changed,5 but the 
public’s trust in the restaurant’s ability to provide “food with 
integrity” was shaken after fifty-five customers became severely 
ill.6  Twenty-one of these fifty-five customers had to be 
hospitalized during the 2015 outbreak that spanned eleven 
states.7  Unfortunately, this was not Chipotle’s first major 
foodborne illness outbreak.8  In fact, this E. coli outbreak 
occurred just months after hundreds of Chipotle patrons reported 
severe illness from outbreaks of Salmonella and norovirus in the 
restaurant’s food product.9 
Food companies and food law commentators are awaiting 
to see how the United States Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) holds Chipotle, a company with over 1,800 restaurant 
locations and a market cap of $13.1 billion, accountable for their 
food safety procedures that caused repeated outbreaks and 
severe illness for hundreds of Americans.10  Recent FDA action 
3. See Brad Tuttle, How Chipotle Went from Industry Darling to Restaurant to
Avoid, TIME (Dec. 8, 2015), http://time.com/money/4140531/chipotle-e-coli-outbreak-
brand-reputation/ [https://perma.cc/VW4H-XG92].  
4. Id.
5. See Malcolm, supra note 2.
6. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Investigates Multistate Outbreak of E. Coli




8. See Coral Beach, UPDATED: CDC Declares Chipotle E. Coli Outbreaks Over;
Cause Unknown, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/02/cdc-declares-chipotle-e-coli-outbreaks-over-
cause-unknown/#.WA-V0E0zV9A [https://perma.cc/KQZ7-AQEY].  
9. Id.
10. See The World’s Most Innovative Companies, FORBES (May 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/companies/chipotle-mexican-grill/ [https://perma.cc/J67R-PQ6D]; 
Sarah N. Lynch, Chipotle Outbreak Eyed by Justice Dept. Consumer Unit, REUTERS (Jan. 
8, 2016, 10:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-chipotle-mexican-u-s-justice-dept-
idUSKBN0UM2GS20160109 [https://perma.cc/L5PM-TRXE]; Hayley Peterson, The 
Ridiculous Reason McDonald’s Sold Chipotle and Missed Out on Billions of Dollars, BUS. 
INSIDER (May 22, 2015, 3:11 PM),  http://www.businessinsider.com/the-ridiculous-reason-
mcdonalds-sold-chipotle-2015-5 [https://perma.cc/6W4E-SJR8]. 
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indicates that the agency may start by establishing a criminal 
record for Chipotle’s corporate officers.11 
The high-profile Chipotle foodborne illness outbreaks 
emerge at a critical time for federal food safety enforcement.  
Under the Obama administration, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) has declared the enforcement of food safety standards as 
a high priority.12  Furthermore, the FDA and the DOJ have 
elected to enforce food safety standards by imposing criminal 
liability created under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA) on food companies “responsible corporate 
officers.”13  The FDA believes the rarely-used doctrine will hold 
companies more accountable for their harmful food safety 
procedures because corporate officers have incentive to 
proactively avert the implementation and continuance of such 
procedures.14  Further, proponents of the doctrine note that 
corporate officers have control to implement policies and 
procedures that will prevent FDCA violations.15 
Alarmingly, as an increasing number of food company 
corporate officers have been investigated and prosecuted under 
the responsible corporate officer doctrine,16 it has become 
difficult to identify the precise legal standards the DOJ uses to 
decide whether prosecution is appropriate.17  Although some 
corporate officers are charged and prosecuted for their 
company’s FDCA violations, almost as many officers in 
11. See Lynch, supra note 10.
12. See Mizer, supra note 1.
13. Roscoe C. Howard Jr. & Leasa Woods Anderson, Trends in Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine Under FDCA, LAW360 (Dec. 14, 2015, 1:11 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/737403/trends-in-responsible-corporate-officer-doctrine-
under-fdca [https://perma.cc/HV6E-RXSL].  
14. Dan Flynn, Reprieve from Criminal Prosecutions May Be Ending for Food
Execs, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May 4, 2012), 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/05/criminal-prosecution-drought-may-be-ending-
for-food-execs/#.WNQM1s8rKUI [https://perma.cc/F3QV-N75T].  Dr. Margaret 
Hamburg, the top-ranking official at the FDA, suggested that the FDA and the DOJ would 
establish renewed prioritization of food safety enforcement through “the appropriate use of 
misdemeanor prosecutions” that would “hold responsible corporate officers accountable” 
for food safety violations by their companies.  Id. 
15. Amiad Kushner, Applying the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine Outside
the Public Welfare Context, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 681, 693 (2003). 
16. See Howard & Anderson, supra note 13.
17. See infra Part II.
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comparable factual scenarios have escaped criminal 
prosecution.18 
This Comment asserts that the current inconsistent 
prosecution of corporate officers for the FDCA violations of 
their companies demonstrates that the statute currently denies 
food company corporate officers their due process rights under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution 
because corporate officers may be convicted of a crime without 
“fair warning” of the conduct that makes their actions criminal.19  
Accordingly, the FDCA statute should be amended to remove 
strict liability misdemeanor charges that allow for easy 
convictions and potential prison time for corporate officers’ 
actions that have minimal culpability. 
My argument that the FDCA statute denies responsible 
corporate officers their due process right to fair warning is 
proven in three parts.  Initially, this Comment provides 
background on the development of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act and its creation of misdemeanor and felony 
criminal charges for adulterating and distributing adulterated 
food into interstate commerce.  Through an analysis of 
Dotterweich and Park, Part I exposes how the Supreme Court 
inappropriately strayed from the common law trend of requiring 
criminal prosecutors to prove mens rea in food adulteration 
cases to finding criminal liability if an individual has a 
responsible relation to the cause of the food adulteration. 
Part I argues that the FDCA improperly subjects 
responsible corporate officers to strict-liability criminal 
conviction based on the flawed justification that the crime is a 
“public welfare offense.”  Responsible corporate officer 
prosecution for food safety violations under the FDCA is not cut 
and dry, as demonstrated by the calculus of guidelines 
prosecutors consider before pursuing charges.  Thus, applying 
strict liability to FDCA misdemeanors based on a public welfare 
offense justification produces unfair and unjust results.  
18. Id.
19. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001) (explaining that the United
States Supreme Court has often recognized the “basic principle that a criminal statute must 
give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime”). 
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Different than traffic offenses, the most common public welfare 
offense, where violation of the statute is clear and requires the 
individual charged with the crime to commit the act, responsible 
corporate officer convictions do not require the corporate officer 
to violate the statute but merely be in a position of responsibility 
when the company’s food safety procedures fail. 
In response to this theoretical problem, Part II reveals that 
the current application of the prosecutorial guidelines 
promulgated by the FDA and utilized by the DOJ provide 
corporate officers minimal guidance regarding how their 
conduct leads to criminal prosecution.  Part II analyzes six major 
food adulteration cases since 2014 and contemplates how DOJ 
prosecutors have practically applied prosecutorial guidelines for 
FDCA cases when considering whether to prosecute corporate 
officers under the responsible corporate officer doctrine.  These 
case analyses demonstrate that the application of the current 
guidelines is wildly inconsistent.  Consequently, corporate 
officers are unable to use recent food adulteration cases to guide 
their compliance procedures and policies. 
Thus, Part III of this Comment recommends that Congress 
remove misdemeanor charges in the FDCA for food adulteration 
crimes.  Using the Chipotle foodborne illness outbreak incident 
as an example, this portion of the Comment establishes that 
removal of misdemeanor offenses under the FDCA would have 
provided “fair warning” to Chipotle CEO Steve Ells as to what 
conduct would subject him to criminal liability as a responsible 
corporate officer of the company. 
I.  THE CREATION OF THE RESPONSIBLE 
CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE 
A. Statutory Authority to Pursue Criminal Charges 
Under the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act. 
Since 1938, American companies’ production and shipment 
of food products has been regulated under the Federal Food, 
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).20  One of the central reasons 
for the passage of the Act was to ensure the safety of the 
American food supply by prohibiting the production or shipment 
of “adulterated” food.21  Section 331 of the FDCA accomplishes 
this goal by prohibiting food companies from “adulterat[ing]” 
food products or introducing, delivering, or receiving 
“adulterated” food products in interstate commerce.22  One way 
the Act considers a food to be “adulterated” is if the food “bears 
or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may 
render it injurious to health . . . or [] if it has been prepared, 
packed, or held under unsanitary conditions whereby it may 
have become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have 
been rendered injurious to health.”23  This definition of 
“adulterated” encompasses food products that cause foodborne 
illness.24  Accordingly, the FDA frequently cites this section of 
the FDCA when notifying food companies of their food safety 
violations and choosing to press charges in foodborne illness 
cases.25 
Although the FDA has authority under the FDCA to inspect 
company premises related to “regulated activity,”26 the agency is 
not authorized to prosecute criminal violations of the FDCA.27  
20. See 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2015).
21. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 986 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act . . . is designed to ensure the safety of the food we eat by prohibiting the 
sale of food that is ‘adulterated.’”). 
22. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2015).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2016).
24. See Helen Bottemiller Evich, Prosecutions Scare Food Industry, POLITICO (Oct.
9, 2013, 5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/prosecutions-scare-food-
industry-098011 [https://perma.cc/VL3Z-X68A] (discussing the recent trend of the FDA 
filing criminal charges against business leaders in the food industry for foodborne illness 
outbreaks). 
25. See BRENT J. GURNEY ET. AL., THE CRIME OF DOING NOTHING: STRICT 
LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE OFFICERS UNDER THE FDCA, at F-9, F-10, 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/Editorial/Pu
blication/The_Crime_of_Doing_Nothing.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD93-J2L7].  
26. John W. Lundquist & Sandra L. Conroy, Defending Against Food and Drug Law
Prosecutions, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW.: THE CHAMPION (July 1997), 
https://www.nacdl.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/97jul02.htm [https://perma.cc/5D8V-
66KD]. 
27. See Patrick O’Leary, Credible Deterrence: FDA and the Park Doctrine in the
21st Century, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 137, 139 (2013). 
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Rather, FDCA criminal prosecutions are tried by the DOJ.28  
Accordingly, criminal prosecutions under the FDCA result from 
FDA referral to the DOJ or by independent initiation of a federal 
prosecutor.29  The DOJ has “absolute discretion” in civil and 
criminal cases to decide when it is appropriate to prosecute or 
enforce the statutory provisions of the FDCA.30 
Where the DOJ has determined that a “person” has 
introduced “adulterated” food into interstate commerce, the 
FDCA “provides for a two-tiered system of criminal sanctions, 
establishing a strict liability misdemeanor offense for violating 
any of the prohibited-acts provisions under section 301 and a 
more severe felony offense for second violations and violations 
committed with ‘intent to defraud or mislead.’”31  Accordingly, a 
person may be charged with a misdemeanor crime without 
knowledge of—or intent to commit—the FDCA violation.32  If a 
person is charged with a misdemeanor under section 333 of the 
FDCA, the person “shall be imprisoned for not more than one 
year or fined not more than $1,000, or both.”33  If the person is 
charged with a felony on the other hand, the person “shall be 
imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more than 
$10,000, or both.”34  These penalties, however, may be increased 
significantly.35  For example, a misdemeanor fine may be 
increased to a maximum of $500,000 if the violation results in 
death.36 
B. Park Doctrine Prosecutions: Imputing Liability on a 
“Responsible Corporate Officer” 
Strict liability offenses, such as the misdemeanor offense 
for adulterated food in the FDCA statute, are commonly 
28. Id. at 140.
29. Id.
30. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
31. O’Leary, supra note 27.
32. See id. at 139.
33. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (a)(1) (2016).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (a)(1).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(4) (2016) (outlining fines for both individuals, which can be
increased to $100,000, and organizations, which can be increased to $500,000). 
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(4).
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criticized in the criminal law context.37  This is largely because 
crime, as developed under the common law, generally includes 
both an “evil-meaning mind” and an “evil-doing hand.”38  
However, strict liability offenses dispense with the mental 
culpability element and instead require only an act or omission 
by the actor to trigger criminal liability.39  Many strict liability 
offenses were established because the acts or omissions in 
question were “public welfare offenses.”40  Public welfare 
offenses in their original form were generally regulatory 
offenses involving potential public harm that imposed light 
penalties on individuals for violating the offense.41  Courts were 
willing to “override the interest” of innocent defendants and 
penalize them without proof of intent to commit the violation 
because the harm caused to the public was direct and 
widespread.42 
In England, the sale of adulterated food was originally a 
crime that required intent to commit the violation.43  However, 
in Regina v. Woodrow, the Court of Exchequer diverted from the 
common law norm of requiring criminal intent and held that an 
individual that had purchased and distributed adulterated 
tobacco without knowledge or reason to know it was adulterated 
was still criminally liable.44  The English court stated that 
37. See Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 830
(1999); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 
731, 731 (1960) (“The proliferation of so-called ‘strict liability’ offenses in the criminal law 
has occasioned the vociferous, continued, and almost unanimous criticism of analysts and 
philosophers of the law.”). 
38. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952); Francis B. Sayre,
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55 (1933). 
39. Sayre, supra note 38.
40. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255.  Public welfare offenses are thought to have been
created around “the middle of the nineteenth century.  Before this, convictions for crime 
without proof of a mens rea are to be found only occasionally, chiefly among the nuisance 
cases.”  Sayre, supra note 38, at 56. 
41. Sayre, supra note 38, at 68; see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 617-
18 (1994) (“In rehearsing the characteristics of the public welfare offense, we, too, have 
included in our consideration the punishments imposed and have noted that ‘penalties 
commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s 
reputation.’”). 
42. Sayre, supra note 38, at 68.
43. Id. at 57-58.
44. Id. at 58.
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although dispensing with the criminal intent element “may 
produce mischief because an innocent man may suffer from his 
want of care in not examining the tobacco he has received, and 
not taking a warranty; but the public inconvenience would be 
much greater, if in every case the officers were obliged to prove 
knowledge.”45  The doctrine of public welfare offenses is 
believed to have begun with food adulteration cases such as 
Woodrow.46 
This doctrine failed to catch on in America until the middle 
of the nineteenth century.47  At that time, state courts began to 
dispense of the intent element in crimes that were the result of 
violations of statutory regulations.48  In fact, the public welfare 
offense doctrine became “firmly established” in food 
adulteration cases in Massachusetts by the late nineteenth 
century.49  As society became more complex and statutory 
regulations increased, states increasingly took the public welfare 
offense doctrine first developed in food adulteration cases and 
began to apply it broadly to offenses such as traffic violations 
that warranted small monetary penalties.50 
Imposing strict liability grounded in the public welfare 
offense theory can serve an extremely useful purpose.  Look no 
further than traffic violations.  For example, in 1933, over a third 
of the cases in Massachusetts courts were regarding traffic or 
motor vehicle violations.51  That amounted to almost 70,000 
cases in that year.52  As Francis Sayre points out in Public 
Welfare Offenses, with a docket filled with traffic and motor 
vehicle violations, it would be nearly impossible to “examine the 
subjective intent of each defendant, even were such 
45. Id.
46. Id. at 61.
47. Sayre, supra note 38, at 62; see also Andrew C. Hanson, Section 309(c) of the
Clean Water Act: Using the Model Penal Code to Clarify Mental State in Water Pollution 
Crimes, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 731, 740 (2003).  
48. Sayre, supra note 38, at 63.
49. Id. at 64.
50. Id. at 67; see also Hanson, supra note 47, at 731.
51. Sayre, supra note 38, at 69.
52. Id. at 69 n.49.
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determination desirable.”53  Accordingly, strict liability in the 
traffic offense context became a practical and effective solution. 
However, when strict liability offenses impose substantial 
punishment on innocent actors, the criminal punishment begins 
to lose its sense of justice.54  Thus, following Sayre’s approach, 
strict liability offenses based on the public welfare offense 
doctrine should only be established when (1) the ability to 
determine if the offense was committed can be done without 
evidence of guilty intent and (2) the punishment for the offense 
does not subject the offender to a prison sentence.55 
Present misdemeanor prosecution of corporate officers 
under the FDCA fails both of these standards.  First, the 
determination of whether the responsible corporate officer 
violated the FDCA statute cannot be determined without 
evidence of guilty intent because the corporate officer may not 
be the actor that causes the violation of the statute.56  In traffic 
offenses, the driver is the actor that has broken the speed limit or 
driven without their lights on.  By violating the statue, 
intentionally or unintentionally, the driver of the car has 
personally put the public at risk of harm.  Thus, for the safety of 
the public, we believe that promoting a safer community 
outweighs the risk of imposing a small fine on an innocent 
driver who violated the statute without intent. 
53. Id. at 69.
54. Sayre, supra note 38, at 70.  Sayre famously opines in his article that “[t]he sense
of justice of the community will not tolerate the infliction of punishment which is 
substantial upon those innocent of intentional or negligent wrongdoing . . . .”  Id.  The 
United States Supreme Court has echoed this sentiment stating, “In a system that generally 
requires a ‘vicious will’ to establish a crime . . . imposing severe punishments for offenses 
that require no mens rea would seem incongruous.”  Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 
616-17 (1994). 
55. Sayre, supra note 38, at 72; see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
253-57 (1952) (supporting Sayre’s public welfare offense elements by confirming that the 
Court’s previously recognized public welfare offenses require “no mental element but 
consist only of forbidden acts or omissions” and that the penalties imposed were “relatively 
small” in a manner that would not cause “grave damage to [the] offender’s reputation.”); 
Staples, 511 U.S. at 618.  
56. See Kushner, supra note 15, at 695, 702-03 (“The primary concern of an officer
liability regime should be the distribution of liability among a class of potential officer 
defendants, each member of which might have contributed to a corporate crime.  The 
classical form of the public welfare doctrine is unsuited to resolve this problem . . . .”). 
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On the other hand, in a food adulteration case—such as 
when a foodborne illness outbreak occurs that is traced back to a 
large company—a corporate officer who is unaware that the 
company’s products are adulterated may not personally put the 
public at risk of harm.  In fact, in some cases, the corporate 
officer has no idea that the company is shipping adulterated food 
in interstate commerce.57  This reasoning explains why 
prosecutors currently consider multiple factors that require fact-
intensive inquiry and balancing considerations to find the 
responsible corporate officer criminally liable under the FDCA 
statute.58  Consequently, to punish a corporate officer who has 
not personally caused the public to be at risk of harm, solely 
because she had control of the agent or the process that 
ultimately caused the public to be at risk of harm undermines the 
sense of justice and deterrence justifications that form the 
foundation of the public welfare offense doctrine.59 
One contention to this argument is that corporate 
executives are held liable in other contexts for the misdeeds of 
the corporation, so the food industry should be no different.  
However, in most industries, criminal actions by the corporate 
executive still require knowledge or willfulness as an element of 
the crime.60  The FDCA is an exception to this rule.61  Further, 
proponents of strict liability in FDCA cases argue that if 
corporate executives are not held liable for their company’s 
violations, justice may go unserved.62  However, a review of the 
Chipotle case refutes this argument.  Currently, Mr. Ells has not 
been subjected to criminal liability for the Chipotle FDCA 
57. See Bill Marler, If You Are a Manufacturer of Adulterated Food Can You Face




58. See Kushner, supra note 15, at 694 n.88.
59. See Sayre, supra note 38, at 70; Staples, 511 U.S. at 616-17.
60. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254-56 (1952).
61. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281-83 (1943).
62. See Thomas Sullivan, The Park Doctrine and FDCA Violations: Holding
Corporate Executives Accountable, POL’Y & MEDICINE (Nov. 29, 2011, 6:43 AM), 
http://www.policymed.com/2011/11/the-park-doctrine-and-fdca-violations-holding-
corporate-executives-accountable.html [https://perma.cc/6RGP-FB7P].  
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violations.63  Nevertheless, Chipotle and Mr. Ells have suffered 
severe consequences because of the company’s extensive food 
safety violations. 
Chiefly, profits for the company were down eighty-two 
percent in 2016.64  The public corporation’s shares nose-dived 
after the outbreak, plunging from $750 per share in 2013 to 
$495.62 in 2015.65  Further, Mr. Ells, as of 2014, owned 339,474 
shares.66  Thus, if Mr. Ells retained his stock during the 
aftermath of the foodborne illness outbreak, Mr. Ells lost 
approximately $86,000,000 in stock value, an enormous 
punishment and deterrent against future food safety failures.  
Accordingly, it is simply untrue to state that Chipotle or Mr. Ells 
“escaped” repercussions of the company’s actions even if Mr. 
Ells is not criminally charged under the FDCA.  Importantly, 
this result is unlikely to be cabined to Mr. Ells’ circumstance, 
because most corporate officers now receive a majority of their 
compensation in stock.67  Regardless, without proof of 
knowledge or wrongful intent, it is manifestly unfair to place 
criminal liability on an individual solely because she or he is a 
corporate officer in responsible relation to the incident.  
63. Chipotle has not yet faced any criminal charges for its foodborne illness
outbreak.  See Alberto Luperon, Now Even the Feds Are Investigating Chipotle’s Virus 
Outbreak, MEDIATE (Jan. 6, 2016, 1:57 PM), http://www.mediaite.com/online/feds-hey-
chipotle-do-you-make-people-sick/ [https://perma.cc/EA2Q-AGFD].  However, the 
company and its employees (like CEO Steve Ells) are currently under criminal 
investigation for the outbreak.  See Kim Janssen & Robert Channick, Feds Probing 
Norovirus Outbreak at Chipotle, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2016, 4:31 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-chipotle-criminal-investigation-20160106-
story.html [https://perma.cc/BAS9-MWWB]. 
64. See Jackie Wattles, Chipotle Profits Down 82% in Wake of E. Coli Outbreaks,
CNN MONEY (July 22, 2016, 8:54 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/21/investing/chipotle-earnings/ [https://perma.cc/QS8B-
JGPB].  
65. See Dan Flynn, Chipotle Outbreak Illness Count Hits 514 as CMG Stock Dives
Below $500, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Dec. 23, 2015), 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/12/chipotle-outbreak-illness-count-hits-514-as-cmg-
stock-dives-below-500/#.WLMDVzsrJPY [https://perma.cc/74XH-Q8SY].  
66. See Brian Solomon, Why Chipotle’s Founder Isn’t a Burrito Billionaire (And
May Never Be), FORBES (July 22, 2014, 12:35 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2014/07/22/why-chipotles-founder-still-isnt-a-
billionaire-and-may-never-be/#7f0f4ad01557 [https://perma.cc/YG99-ENMG]. 
67. See Martin Zimmerman, GM and Ford Chief Executives Putting Their Salary on
the Line, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/03/business/fi-
autopay3 [https://perma.cc/8TQL-2FH3].   
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Corporate officers will undoubtedly face severe financial and 
professional consequences without imposing the iron fist of the 
Department of Justice. 
Second, even under a misdemeanor charge, the officers 
may be subject to a year in prison.68  Section 333(a) of the 
FDCA articulates that: 
(1)  Any person who violates a provision of section 331 of 
this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or 
fined for not more than $1,000, or both. 
(2)  Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this 
section, if any person commits such a violation after a 
conviction of him under this section has become final, or 
commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or 
mislead, such person shall be imprisoned for not more than 
three years or fined not more than $10,000, or both.69 
Thus, misdemeanor offenses under the FDCA provide 
potential criminal liability that is substantial.  Accordingly, the 
current FDCA misdemeanor prosecution of responsible 
corporate officers dispenses with the two most important 
hallmarks of public welfare offenses.70  In its noble quest to 
protect the public welfare, the United States Supreme Court has 
forgotten the interest of innocent corporate officers by 
sanctioning the prosecution of strict liability criminal offenses 
regardless of whether a corporate officer knew they were 
causing harm or how substantial the punishment the corporate 
officer may suffer.71 
1. Dotterweich: Guilty By “Reasonable Relation”
The United States Supreme Court first demonstrated a 
willingness to hold corporate officers strictly liable for the 
FDCA violations of their corporation under the public welfare 
68. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2015).
69. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (emphasis added).
70. See David E. Frulla et al., Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: Strict
Criminal Liability for Regulatory Violations, KELLEY DRYE (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://m.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/1771 [https://perma.cc/9LPQ-UXV4]. 
71. Id.
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offense doctrine in United States v. Dotterweich.72  Buffalo 
Pharmacal Company, Inc. (Buffalo), a drugs “jobber,”73 
purchased prescription drugs from manufacturers and 
repackaged them using their own label, before shipping the 
drugs in interstate commerce.74  The company and Joseph 
Dotterweich,75 president and general manager of Buffalo, were 
prosecuted and convicted for shipping misbranded products and 
an adulterated drug in interstate commerce.76  Mr. Dotterweich, 
the top corporate officer of the company was found to have “had 
no personal connection” with the shipments that resulted in the 
prosecution.77  However, he was in “general charge” of the 
corporation’s business and gave “general instructions” to the 
company’s employees to fill the orders for the shipments.78  At 
trial, the jury found that Mr. Dotterweich was guilty on all three 
counts.79 
On appeal before the United States Supreme Court, 
Dotterweich argued that he could not be held criminally liable 
for the FDCA violations of his company.80  His argument 
followed that the FDCA’s reference to “any person” could not 
implicate him as an agent for the company, because the term 
“person” was limited to the corporation.81  Nevertheless, the 
Court held that “[i]n the interest of the larger good it puts the 
burden of acting at hazard a person otherwise innocent but 
standing in responsible relation to a public danger.”82  In 
signaling that the company’s FDCA violations were public 
welfare offenses, the Dotterweich Court eliminated the 
72. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281-83 (1943).
73. A drug “jobber” has been defined as “one who is involved with the legitimate
distribution of drugs to authorized outlets . . . .”  See State v. Boisvert, 348 A.2d 7, 10 (Me. 
1975). 
74. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278 (1943).
75. See United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942).
76. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278.
77. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d at 501.
78. Id.
79. Id.  It is interesting to note, that although Mr. Dotterweich was found guilty for
the counts of misbranding and adulteration of the drugs, the corporation was not found 
guilty.  Id.  
80. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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conventional requirement of awareness of some wrongdoing and 
placed the statutory liability on individuals in responsible 
relation to the act that causes a public harm.83  Thus, for the first 
time under the FDCA, the Court affirmed that a corporate 
officer could be subjected personally to criminal liability for the 
acts of company employees that the corporate officer did not 
know about or approve.84 
The Dotterweich Court, however, chose not to define which 
employees within a company may be considered in “responsible 
relation” to public danger.85  Lower court cases after 
Dotterweich held that the corporate official did not have to 
personally commit the act causing the violation, know it 
occurred, or be physically present when it occurred.86  Rather, 
the Court left the determination of “responsible relation” to “the 
good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and 
the ultimate judgment of juries . . . .”87  Although Mr. 
Dotterweich only received a $500 fine for each count and a 
sixty-day probationary period,88 the Court’s responsible relation 
holding opened the door wide open for the Park court to 
establish the responsible corporate officer doctrine in food 
adulteration cases. 
2. Park: Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in
Food Adulteration Cases 
From 1934, when the Dotterweich decision was handed 
down, until 1975, food industry counsel questioned whether 
Dotterweich would apply to food adulteration cases under the 
FDCA.89  However, the Park court dispensed with this notion 
when it held that John Park, CEO of Acme Markets, Inc., a 
national retail food chain with 874 retail locations and 36,000 
83. See Daniel F. O’Keefe Jr. & Marc H. Shapiro, Personal Criminal Liability
Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act—The Dotterweich Doctrine, 30 FOOD 
DRUG COSM. L.J. 5, 8 (1975). 
84. Id.; Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
85. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
86. O’Keefe & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 19.
87. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
88. See U.S. v.  Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281-83 (1943).
89. O’Keefe & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 18.
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employees, could be charged with a misdemeanor for 
introducing adulterated food in interstate commerce.90  The 
Supreme Court held that as a “responsible corporate offic[er],” 
Mr. Park had the “power to prevent or correct violations of [the 
FDCA’s] provisions.”91  Inspections at an Acme warehouse in 
Baltimore uncovered evidence of rodent infestation of food 
products.92  In January of 1972, the FDA notified Park by a letter 
received at the corporation’s headquarters in Philadelphia of the 
conditions in violation of the FDCA.93  Mr. Park spoke with 
other executives of the company who assured him that the vice-
president of that location would take care of the problems.94  
After a second FDA inspection in March 1972 revealed similar 
conditions, the DOJ filed charges against the corporation and 
Mr. Park under the FDCA.95 
Park argued at trial that through his responsibilities as CEO 
of a large company, he was not personally involved in the 
FDCA violation.96  Further, Park argued that he had done all he 
could do to remedy the violations.97  Nevertheless, the jury 
found Park guilty of all charges against him.98  He was 
sentenced to pay a fine of fifty dollars on each count.99  On 
appeal, the United States Supreme Court held the conviction was 
proper because the FDCA imposed a duty on “responsible 
corporate agents” “to seek out and remedy violations when they 
occur” and “to implement measures that will ensure that 
violations will not occur.”100 
The Court noted that an FDCA charge cannot be brought 
against a corporate officer simply because of the officer’s 
90. S. Prakash Sethi & Robert W. Katz, The Expanding Scope of Personal Criminal
Liability of Corporate Executives—Some Implications of United States v. Park, 32 FOOD 
DRUG COSM. L.J. 544, 545-47 (1977); see also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 676-77 
(1975).  
91. Park, 421 U.S. at 676.
92. Id. at 660.
93. Id. at 661-62.
94. O’Keefe & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 21.
95. See Park, 421 U.S. at 662.
96. Id. at 676 n.17.
97. Id. at 664.
98. Id. at 666.
99. Id.
100.  Park, 421 U.S. at 672; Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285. 
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position in the company, but only if the jury finds the individual 
“had authority and responsibility to deal with the situation.”101  
Thus, after Park, for the DOJ to get a conviction against a 
responsible corporate officer resulting in a potential prison 
sentence and/or extensive fines, the DOJ only has to prove that 
“the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, 
responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, 
or promptly to correct, the violation complained of . . . .”102  The 
Government does not have to prove “wrongful action.”103  
Notably, the punishment in Dotterweich and Park was minimal, 
each receiving a fine for less than $1,000 and serving no prison 
time.104  However, as discussed above, the stakes for criminal 
prosecution under the current FDCA is much higher.105 
During the Park litigation, a critical concern raised but not 
recognized as a crucial part of the resolution of the case was the 
possibility that imposing liability on responsible corporate 
officers would result in criminal prosecution that allowed the 
DOJ to enforce the statute without consistently applying 
guidelines or standards.106  Those in opposition to the 
Government’s “responsible corporate officer” test argued this 
rule would result in unfair prosecution based simply on the title 
101.  Park, 421 U.S. at 674.  The court recognized the defendant may raise a defense 
claiming the defendant was “‘powerless’ to prevent or correct the violation.”  Id. at 673 
(quoting United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964)). 
102.  Id. at 673-74. 
103.  Id. at 673. 
104.  See Park, 421 U.S. at 666; United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 
500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942). 
105.  See infra Part II. 
106.  See Joshua D. Greenberg & Ellen C. Brotman, Strict Vicarious Liability for 
Corporations and Corporate Executives: Stretching the Boundaries of Criminalization, 51 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 79, 93 (2014) (“Because the FDA’s ‘guidance’ provides none, the 
agency is effectively mirroring the approach taken in Dotterweich, where the Supreme 
Court relied on ‘conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers’ to decide when to 
hold company executives strictly liable under the FDCA.  Prosecutors have unfettered 
discretion to bring Park doctrine cases as a result, which creates reason for substantial fear 
and uncertainty among corporate executives in industries regulated by the FDA.”). 
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of an individual’s job rather than their wrongful conduct.107  
Nevertheless, the Court opted to follow the Government’s 
responsible corporate officer test,108 which has resulted in 
arbitrary and inconsistent prosecution of food adulteration cases 
and has denied corporate officers a “fair warning” of what 
guidelines the DOJ actually uses to determine when prosecution 
is appropriate.109 
Currently the FDCA statutory text is silent regarding when 
a “responsible corporate officer” should be prosecuted under the 
statute.110  However, the FDA has fashioned a set of guidelines 
prosecutors are provided to consider when deciding whether to 
charge the corporate officers for the FDCA violations of their 
company.111  The FDA Regulatory Procedures Manual lists 
seven (non-exclusive) relevant factors prosecutors should 
consider in responsible corporate officer prosecutions under the 
FDCA including: 
(1) Whether the violation involves actual or potential harm 
to the public; 
(2) Whether the violation is obvious; 
(3) Whether the violation reflects a pattern of illegal 
behavior and/or failure to heed prior warnings; 
(4) Whether the violation is widespread; 
(5) Whether the violation is serious; 
(6) The quality of the legal and factual support for the 
proposed prosecution; and 
(7) Whether the proposed prosecution is a prudent use of 
agency resources.112 
107.  Sethi & Katz, supra note 90, at 559.  In their amicus brief, the Grocery 
Manufacturers of America argued that following the responsible corporate officer test 
“would expose corporate officers to criminal prosecution at the bureaucratic discretion of 
enforcement officials without . . . ‘guidelines,’ ‘criteria,’ or ‘standards,’” which would 
authorize  “harsh and arbitrary criminal prosecutions under the Act, based on corporate 
status rather than individual ‘wrongful action’ . . . .”  Id. 
108.  See Park, 421 U.S. at 669-70. 
109.  See Sethi & Katz, supra note 90, at 559-60. 




111.  Id. at 6-48 to -49. 
112.  Id. 
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These factors, as they currently exist, are non-exclusive and 
provide prosecutorial discretion mandated by the Court.113  
However, looking at recent foodborne illness cases, as we will 
do in Part II, these factors have been applied in an extremely 
inconsistent manner to the point that each decision by the DOJ 
to prosecute or not is largely unpredictable and fails to provide 
“fair warning” as to what actions or omissions responsible 
corporate officers will be charged for under the statute.114 
II. FAIR WARNING OR JUMBLED MESS: HOW
RECENT FOOD ADULTERATION CASES PROVIDE 
LITTLE GUIDANCE OF WHAT ACTIONS WILL BE 
PROSECUTED UNDER THE STATUTE 
Since 2013, there have been six major foodborne illness 
incidents that present comparable factual scenarios.  The cases 
include food companies Jensen Farms, Quality Egg LLC, Peanut 
Corporation of America, Glass Onion, Townsend Farms/Costco, 
and Bidart Brothers.  Although the DOJ opted to prosecute 
“responsible corporate officers” at three of these companies for 
the companies’ FDCA violations, they did not pursue 
prosecution against the responsible corporate officers at the 
other three companies.  Importantly, prosecutors acting under 
the FDCA have prosecutorial discretion to determine which 
cases to prosecute.115  However, prosecutorial discretion cannot 
dispense with the constitutional guarantee of “fair warning” to 
provide a person of ordinary intelligence with an understanding 
of what actions will result in criminal liability under the 
statute.116 
The current FDCA language does not provide clear 
guidance of specific actions or omissions that if taken by a 
responsible corporate officer, will result in their personal 
criminal liability.117  As discussed in Part I, this is because the 
113.  Id. 
114.  See infra Part II.  
115.  See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
116.  See id. at 830-31. 
117.  See supra Section I.A.  
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misdemeanor offense under the statute is a strict liability offense 
that only requires the commission of the criminal violation 
stated in the statute.118  Thus, responsible corporate officers only 
have prior foodborne illness outbreaks and FDA/DOJ actions 
regarding those outbreaks to provide them “fair warning” of 
which actions by their companies will result in subjection to 
criminal liability. 
Unfortunately, the six cases below all involved significant 
violations of the FDCA.119  Thus, consistently applying strict 
liability based on the public welfare offense doctrine would 
dictate that responsible corporate officers in all six cases should 
have been prosecuted.120  However, all six cases were not treated 
comparably by the DOJ.121 The case analyses below demonstrate 
that the executives that were prosecuted all knew or should have 
known of company procedures that eventually led to the 
foodborne illness outbreak.122  On the other hand, the executives 
who were not prosecuted had minimal knowledge, at most, of 
company procedures or operations that led to the eventual 
foodborne illness outbreak.123  This practical conclusion further 
supports this article’s proposed solution that the FDCA strict 
liability standard for misdemeanor crimes should be removed 
and replaced with a mens rea requirement. 
A. Executives Prosecuted 
1. Jensen Farms
In June of 2011, Eric and Ryan Jensen, the owners of 
Jensen Farms in Granada, Colorado, installed and maintained a 
processing center for cantaloupes produced on their farm.124  The 
processing center included a conveyor system that was designed 
118.  See supra Section I.A. 
119.  See infra Sections II.A-C. 
120.  See infra Sections II.A-C. 
121.  See infra Sections II.A-C. 
122.  See infra Section II.A. 
123.  See infra Section II.B.  
124.  Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant to 
Sentencing at 6, United States v. Jensen, No. 13-mj-01138-MEH (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://www.defenselitigationinsider.com/files/2015/01/US-v-Jensen-COP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W8QV-EVM7]. 
2017] FOOD WITH INTEGRITY? 469
to clean, cool, and package the cantaloupes for distribution 
throughout the country.125  Specifically, if functioning properly, 
the conveyor system would sufficiently wash the fruit with anti-
bacterial solution to prevent adulteration.126  Jensen Farms 
acquired the conveyor system, originally designed for harvesting 
potatoes, in May 2011.127  The company supplying the conveyor 
system modified the equipment to include a catch pan to support 
a chlorine spray function, which would have reduced the risk of 
microbial contamination of fruit.128  However, the Jensen 
brothers chose not to set up the chlorine spray function.129  On 
July 29, 2011, a retailer received pallets of cantaloupes that were 
adulterated with Listeria from a Jensen Farms packaging 
facility.130  Retailers distributed the cantaloupe to stores located 
in twenty-eight states causing 147 foodborne illnesses, thirty-
three known deaths, and ten other deaths that were likely 
related.131 
The Colorado Department of Health and Environment 
(CDHE) notified the CDC and the FDA of the astronomical 
increase in average number of Listeria cases in September.132  
The CDHE pinpointed that all patients infected with Listeria 
reported eating cantaloupe before they experienced the 
symptoms.133  In response, the FDA sampled Jensen Farms 
cantaloupes and found that the fruit tested positive for the strain 
of Listeria found in all of the infected patients.134  Further, the 
FDA found that multiple locations throughout the Jensen Farms 
packing and storage facility were positive for the strain found in 
the outbreak victims.135  On September 14, 2011, the Jensen’s 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. at 7. 
128.  Id. 
129.  See Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant 
to Sentencing, supra note 124, at 7. 
130.  Id. at 7-8. 
131.  Id. at 14.  
132.  Id. at 12-13. 
133.  Id. at 13.  
134.  See Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant 
to Sentencing, supra note 124, at 13. 
135.  Id. 
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took action by attempting to recall shipments of cantaloupes.136  
Nevertheless, on October 18, 2011, the FDA issued a warning 
letter concluding that Jensen Farms had widespread 
contamination throughout the facility that demonstrated poor 
sanitary practices.137  An FDA Senior Adviser stated that 
“Jensen Farms significantly deviated from industry standards by 
failing to use an anti-microbial . . . in the packing of their 
cantaloupes . . . .”138  As a result, the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
brought federal charges against the Jensen brothers for 
Introduction of an Adulterated Food into Interstate 
Commerce.139  The Jensen brothers eventually plead guilty to 
misdemeanor counts.140  Their indictment called for penalties of 
up to six years in prison and $1.5 million in fines.141 
Applying the prosecutorial guidelines, it is clear that an 
FDCA violation resulted in actual harm under Section 331 of the 
FDCA.142  In fact, some have referred to the outbreak as one of 
the most severe foodborne illness outbreaks in U.S. history.143  
Second, the violation could be deemed obvious.  The Jensen 
brothers knew that the cantaloupe needed to be cleaned 
properly.144  However, the brothers were grossly negligent by 
failing to set up the chlorine wash that would have killed the 
bacteria that ultimately adulterated their produce.145  Third, the 
Jensen Farms case does not reflect a pattern of illegal behavior 
or a failure to heed previous warnings by the Jensen brothers as 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. at 13-14. 
138.  Id. at 14. 
139. See Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant 
to Sentencing, supra note 124, at 3-4. 
140.  Id. at 1. 
141.  Id. at 4-5. 
142.  Id. at 3-4. 
143.  See Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, Third-deadliest U.S. Food Outbreak Was 




144.  See Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant 
to Sentencing, supra note 124, at 7. 
145.  Id. 
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corporate officers of the company.146  Rather, the criminal 
incidents occurred only after Jensen Farms implemented its new 
conveyor system.147  They only received a warning letter from 
the FDA after many of the foodborne illnesses were reported to 
public health officials.148  Fourth, the violation was widespread 
and impacted consumers in twenty-eight states.149  The result of 
shipping adulterated food in interstate commerce was serious as 
thirty-three consumers died and a total of 147 individuals 
reported outbreak-associated illnesses.150  Fifth, the factual proof 
of this case was strong because the Jensen brothers were aware 
of the need to use the chlorine wash to eradicate the cantaloupe 
of the harmful bacteria but knowingly failed to implement the 
chlorine wash procedures while continuing to sell the fruit 
around the country.151 
Thus, DOJ prosecuting attorneys had a strong argument 
that the Jensen brothers’ prosecution was a prudent use of 
agency resources.152  Accordingly, following the prosecutorial 
guidelines, this was an easy case.  It involved two owners 
intimately involved in the operations of their farm.153  It 
involved obvious procedural guards that the owners failed to 
implement and it involved violations that resulted in the death of 
thirty-three consumers.154 
2. Quality Egg, LLC
In August 2010, eggs containing Salmonella bacteria 
sickened thousands of consumers around the country.155  The 
table eggs were traced back to Quality Egg, LLC (Quality Egg), 
146.  See id. (describing the illegal activity of the Jensen brothers, but not mentioning 
any previous illegal activity). 
147.  Id. at 7-12. 
148.  Id. at 13-14.  
149.  Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant to 
Sentencing, supra note 124, at 14. 
150.  See id. 
151.  Id. at 7. 
152.  Id. at 12-14.  
153.  Id. at 6-7. 
154.  Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant to 
Sentencing, supra note 124, at 14. 
155.  United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2016). 
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a company run by executives Austin DeCoster and Peter 
DeCoster.156  The trial court found that Austin DeCoster had 
substantial control over Quality Egg and its assets.157  Peter 
DeCoster was found to have “some control” over the production 
and distribution of shell eggs by the company.158  In 2010, 1,939 
individuals reported illnesses and/or cases of Salmonella 
infection associated with the Quality Egg outbreak.159  The 
DeCosters maintain that they did not have any knowledge 
during the time of the Salmonella outbreak that the eggs their 
company sold were contaminated.160 
However, investigation into the Quality Egg case revealed 
that the company had commissioned tests to detect Salmonella 
and the results of the test came back positive on forty-seven 
percent of the days tested.161  Furthermore, the frequency of the 
test results grew in the months leading up to its recall.162  Quality 
Egg issued a recall, the largest recall of table eggs in U.S. 
history.163  After the company’s recall, the FDA conducted a 
follow-up inspection finding unsanitary conditions including 
dead insects and fecal material pervasive in the facilities.164  
Following its inspection, the FDA issued Quality Egg an 
inspectional report detailing their observations.165  However, 
Quality Egg failed to implement and follow its written 
Salmonella prevention plan.166  As a result, the DeCosters were 
prosecuted under Section 331 of the FDCA for shipping and 
selling shell eggs that contained Salmonella in interstate 
156.  United States v. Quality Egg, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 920, 923 (N.D. Iowa 2015). 
157.  Id.  
158.  Id. at 925. 
159.  Id. at 926. 
160.  Id. 
161.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Quality Egg, Company Owner, and Top 
Executive Sentenced in Connection with Distribution of Adulterated Eggs (Apr. 13, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/quality-egg-company-owner-and-top-executive-sentenced-
connection-distribution-adulterated [https://perma.cc/B4LP-E3LP]. 
162.  Id. 
163.  Dan Flynn, Egg Men Get Extra Time to File for Review with Supreme Court, 
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/12/decosters-
get-extra-time-to-file-for-review-with-supreme-court/#.WPaIE1KZPVo 
[https://perma.cc/W67S-BBCN]. 
164.  United States v. Quality Egg, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 920, 926 (N.D. Iowa 2015). 
165.  Id. at 931. 
166.  Id. 
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commerce as responsible corporate officers.167  The DeCosters 
reached a plea agreement with the DOJ to plead guilty to one 
strict liability misdemeanor and paid a $100,000 fine.168  The 
two men were each sentenced to three months in prison.169 
Applying the prosecutorial guidelines here, first, Quality 
Egg’s adulteration of its table eggs resulted in serious physical 
harm to 1,939 individuals around the country.  Second, the 
violation was obvious.170  Not only did FDA investigations find 
that Quality Egg facilities in Iowa were extremely unsanitary, 
there was also evidence that established that Quality Egg knew 
that its facilities and products were testing positive for 
Salmonella.171  Third, Quality Egg’s failure to implement its 
written Salmonella eradication plan the company proffered to 
the FDA after facility inspection exposed rampant Salmonella 
contamination, was just one bad act in a pattern of illegal 
behavior by Quality Egg and the DeCosters.172  Quality Egg was 
also found to have misbranded their egg products and had 
previously bribed USDA inspectors.173  Furthermore, Peter 
DeCoster had previously been convicted of falsifying driving 
logs within another business.174  The facts as applied to the 
guidelines strongly weighed against the DeCosters in the 
determination of their conviction.  Additionally, their violation 
was widespread.175  The adulterated eggs had injured individuals 
in ten different states.176  Further, the USDA had investigated 
and allowed Quality Egg the opportunity to fix the identified 
sanitation issues.177  However, Quality Egg failed to implement 
its designated correction plans.178  This provided plenty of legal 
and factual support for the prosecution of the DeCosters.  Thus, 
167.  Id. at 924. 
168.  See United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 2016). 
169.  Id. 
170.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 161. 
171.  DeCoster, 828 F.3d at 631. 
172.  United States v. Quality Egg, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 920, 931 (N.D. Iowa 2015). 
173.  Id. at 945-46. 
174.  Id. at 943. 
175.  Id. at 932. 
176.  Id. at 923. 
177.  United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2016). 
178.  Id. at 630-31. 
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it follows that this open and shut case was also a prudent use for 
agency resources. 
3. Peanut Corporation of America
In 2009, a Salmonella outbreak resulted from a peanut 
butter paste that was manufactured by the Peanut Corporation of 
America.179  The outbreak killed nine people and sickened 
another 714 consumers across forty-six states.180  The outbreak 
was considered the deadliest Salmonella outbreak in recent 
history.181  The outbreak also resulted in a huge food recall that 
spanned from cookies to airline snacks.182  In contrast to the two 
cases above, in this case there was clear evidence that Stewart 
Parnell, the owner and president of the peanut processing 
company, knew that his products were adulterated and chose to 
distribute the products anyway.183  After the Salmonella 
outbreak began to spread, the FDA identified that the processing 
company’s plant was rife with “mold, roaches, dirty equipment, 
holes big enough to allow rodents inside and a failure to separate 
raw and cooked products.”184  The company’s own Salmonella 
testing had reported contamination six times over the years.185  
Because Parnell knew of the adulterated product, he was 
charged with a felony rather than a misdemeanor under the 
179.  Kevin McCoy, Peanut Exec. in Salmonella Case Gets 28 Years, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 21, 2015, 5:39 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/09/21/peanut-executive-salmonella-
sentencing/72549166 [https://perma.cc/UW8D-EHJN].  
180.  Id. 
181.  Id. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Lindsey Bever, Former Peanut Plant Executive Faces Life Sentence for Lethal 




184.  Brady Dennis, Executive Who Shipped Tainted Peanuts Gets 28 Years; 9 Died 




185.  Bever, supra note 183. 
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statute.186  Parnell also received a twenty-eight-year prison 
sentence.187 
Applying the prosecutorial guidelines here, the violation 
clearly resulted in actual harm to hundreds of individuals across 
the country.188  Additionally, the adulterated peanut paste was 
obvious because the company’s Salmonella testing had 
produced positive results at least six times during the time frame 
of the outbreak.189  Further, Mr. Parnell was aware of the 
Salmonella problems and chose to ship the products in interstate 
commerce.190  Mr. Parnell’s knowledge of the Salmonella 
presence and his choice to knowingly distribute the products is 
what makes this case extremely egregious.  His statements and 
actions clearly reflect that he was aware of the Salmonella 
contamination and chose not to take preventative measures to 
protect consumers.  The adulteration of the peanut paste was 
widespread and serious and there was plenty of factual evidence 
to demonstrate that Mr. Parnell knew of the food adulteration 
and chose to insert the product into the food supply.  Thus, it is 
unlikely anyone could say that prosecution of Mr. Parnell would 
be an unwise use of agency resources.  On the contrary, Mr. 
Parnell is precisely the type of company executive who this 
Comment advocates should face felony charges.191 
186.  Sindhu Sundar, DOJ Toughens Stance on Food Execs in Peanut Corp. Case, 
LAW360 (Sept. 11, 2015, 10:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/701880/doj-
toughens-stance-on-food-execs-in-peanut-corp-case [https://perma.cc/2UPY-YF62]. 
187.  McCoy, supra note 179. 
188.  Id. 
189.  Georgia Peanut Plant Manager Testifies That Company Faked Salmonella 
Tests, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2014, 6:09 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/georgia-peanut-plant-manager-testifies-
company-faked-salmonella-tests-article-1.1897287 [https://perma.cc/8YQT-86FP]. 
190.  McCoy, supra note 179. 
191.  Thus far, this Comment has presented analyses of three cases that provide 
factor-by-factor explanations of why the company executives should face prosecution for 
the food safety outbreaks of their company.  Importantly, this Comment does not question 
why those individuals face prosecution.  Rather, this Comment is more concerned with the 
recent cases that seemingly present comparable factual issues regarding FDCA violations 
and harm done, but the Department of Justice has chosen to forgo prosecution.  This 
Comment does not question that prosecutors have discretion to bring cases; however, this 
Comment is concerned that a failure to consistently prosecute executives for the food 
safety outbreaks of their company fails to provide fair warning of when company 
executives will be prosecuted for the food safety violations of their company. 
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B. Executives Not Prosecuted 
1. Glass Onion
In 2013, thirty-three consumers across four states 
contracted E. coli that was traced back to pre-packaged salads 
sold at Trader Joes.192  Nine consumers were hospitalized and 
two consumers developed hemolytic uremic syndrome, a 
potentially fatal kidney disease associated with E. coli 
infections.193  The products were produced by Atherstone Foods 
Inc., which was manufacturing the products under the name 
Glass Onion Catering.194  The California Department of Public 
Health investigated Glass Onion facilities but did not find any 
food safety violations.195  Investigators also tested the 
procedures and took environmental samples from the location 
where Glass Onion sourced its romaine lettuce and did not find a 
genetic match of the strain that caused the outbreak.196  The 
health inspectors were not able to locate where the E. coli strain 
in question originated.197 
Applying the prosecutorial guidelines here, the adulterated 
salads produced by Glass Onion caused actual harm to thirty-
three individuals across four states.198  However, the violation 
was not obvious.199  Neither Glass Onion nor its source of 
romaine lettuce were found to have conclusively committed an 
adulteration violation under the FDCA.200  Further, there is no 
evidence that there was a pattern of illegal behavior or a failure 
to heed regulatory warnings.201 
On the contrary, after notice of the violation, both Glass 
Onion and its lettuce supplier implemented further procedures 
192.  CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF AN 
ESCHERICHIA COLI O157:H7 OUTBREAK IN OCTOBER 2013 ASSOCIATED WITH PRE-
PACKAGED SALADS 6 (2014).  
193.  Id. 
194.  Id. at 5, 7. 
195.  Id. at 5. 
196.  Id. 
197.  CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH , supra note 192, at 5. 
198.  Id. 
199.  Id. 
200.  Id. 
201.  Id. at 12. 
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that would limit the possibility of outbreak.202  However, under 
the misdemeanor charge, all the prosecutors would have to 
prove is that the adulterated product was distributed by Glass 
Onion.203  This seems absurd in a case such as this because Glass 
Onion and its produce supplier appear to be wholly innocent.  
Importantly, this violation is serious.  Thirty-three individuals 
contracted illness because of the adulterated food product.204  
Further, there is factual evidence that creates a case that Glass 
Onion distributed an adulterated product in interstate 
commerce.205 
Admittedly, in this case it is much less clear whether 
prosecuting Glass Onion would be prudent.  On one hand, as the 
protector of the American food supply, the DOJ needs to make it 
clear that it will not tolerate the sale of adulterated food, 
regardless of whether the company was aware that their 
procedures would result in such an outcome.  On the other hand, 
Glass Onion has not been shown to have done anything 
wrong.206  In fact, the company appears to be squeaky clean and 
worked diligently to fight the outbreak.207  Accordingly, 
prosecutorial opinion may vary on whether it would be a prudent 
use of resources to prosecute Glass Onion. 
2. Townsend Farms/Costco
In 2013, 162 consumers were confirmed to have contracted 
Hepatitis A after eating Townsend Farms Organic Antioxidant 
Blend.208  The cases spanned ten states touching both coasts.209  
202.  CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 192, at 12. 
203.  See id. 
204.  Id. at 5. 
205.  Id. at 6. 
206.  Id. at 5. 
207.  CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 192, at 12.  
208.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA INVESTIGATES MULTISTATE OUTBREAK OF 




209.  CDC Updates Hepatitis A Outbreak Numbers: 159 Ill in 10 States, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/08/cdc-updates-
hepatitis-a-outbreak-numbers-159-ill-in-10-states/#.WIaH8k0zWUk 
[https://perma.cc/YAV3-92FP].  
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Sixty-nine individuals had cases so severe that they were 
hospitalized.210  Additionally, in a California class action, 
roughly 25,000 individuals alleged injury.211  Townsend Farms 
quickly ordered a recall of the product.212  Public health officials 
ultimately concluded that the adulterated pomegranate seeds 
were imported from Turkey.213  There is no evidence currently 
that the Townsend Farm executives knew of the adulterated 
product.214 
Applying the prosecutorial guidelines, Townsend Farms’ 
FDCA violation of distributing adulterated food products in 
interstate commerce resulted in severe and widespread harm to 
allegedly 25,000 individuals.215  The evidence of injury to those 
individuals as a result of consuming a Townsend Farm’s product 
is very strong.216  On the other hand, there is little evidence that 
suggests that Townsend Farms had repeatedly failed to adhere to 
warnings or can be shown to have a pattern of misbehavior.217  
Finally, if the incident caused injury to thousands of consumers, 
prosecution seems like it would be a prudent way to send a 
message to food producers and food executives that the 
government will not allow them to distribute food that is 
adulterated.218  However, to this point, no criminal action has 
been filed.219 
210.  Id. 
211.  Coral Beach, Costco Offers Vaccines, Denies Liability and Declares Dividend, 
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/04/costco-
offers-hep-a-vaccines-for-current-outbreak-denies-liability-for-2013-outbreak-frozen-fruit-
implicated-both-times/ [https://perma.cc/6UCG-WB2D]. 
212.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 208.  
213.  Id. 
214.  See id. 
215.  See Beach, supra note 211. 
216.  See Multistate Outbreak of Hepatitis A Virus Infections Linked to Pomegranate 
Seeds from Turkey (Final Update), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 28, 
2013, 4:30 PM), https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/outbreaks/2013/a1b-03-31/ 
[https://perma.cc/BK7F-Q5FG] (discussing number of victims and spread of infection from 
specific source). 
217.  See id. (stating that infection was linked to one contaminated shipment of seeds 
not negligence on part of Townsend). 
218.  See Flynn, supra note 14.  
219.  See Bill Marler, Food “Crimes”—When to Prosecute and When to Not?, 
FORBES (July 18, 2015, 10:21 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/billmarler/2015/07/18/food-crimes-when-to-prosecute-and-
when-to-not/#53065df61b3d [https://perma.cc/585Q-7SRS]. 
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3. Bidart Brothers
In 2014, thirty-five consumers reported illness from 
Listeria after eating whole caramel apples.220  The Listeria 
outbreak spanned twelve states and caused thirty-four of the 
thirty-five consumers to be hospitalized.221  Seven of the 
consumers died.222  Eleven of the illnesses were pregnancy-
related and one of the illnesses resulted in fetal loss.223  
Ultimately, the public health officials traced the Listeria 
outbreak to Bidart Brothers, an apple producer in California.224  
Investigators found the Listeria on farm tools, packing drains, 
and on the automatic packing line.225  Additionally, inspectors 
identified that the packing equipment was constructed in a 
manner that prevented the equipment from being properly 
cleaned.226  While there is little evidence regarding how much 
the farm owners knew about the potential adulteration of their 
apples, this case sounds eerily similar to the Jensen Farms case.  
Nevertheless, Bidart Brothers executives have avoided 
prosecution thus far.227 
Applying the prosecutorial guidelines here, Bidart Brothers 
shipping of apples that contained adulterated products resulted 
in a severe, widespread, and serious violation of the FDCA.228  
Further, public health agencies were able to link the foodborne 
illness to the farm’s unsanitary conditions.229  Although there 
was no evidence that Bidart Brothers failed to heed warnings, 
nor was this a step in a line of illegal actions, this case would 
220.  See Dan Flynn, Inspectors Find Listeria at Bidart Bros. Cooling and Packing 
House, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May 27, 2015), 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/05/bidart-bros-cooling-and-packing-house-samples-
were-positive-for-listeria/#.WIaIXU0zWUk [https://perma.cc/V3EM-VCX2]. 
221.  Id. 
222.  Id. 
223.  FDA Investigated Listeria Monocytogenes Illness Linked to Caramel Apples, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 21, 2015), 
https://www.fda.gov/Food/RecallsOutbreaksEmergencies/Outbreaks/ucm427573.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ANN8-F57T]. 
224.  See Flynn, supra note 220. 
225.  Id. 
226.  Id. 
227.  Id. 
228.  See supra Section I.D.  
229.  Flynn, supra note 220. 
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provide another opportunity to enforce the importance of food 
safety through the FDCA.230  Thus, this seems as if prosecution 
would be a prudent use of agency resources.  However, the 
Department of Justice has chosen not to do so.231 
C. Case Analyses Summary 
In summary, the case analyses demonstrate that there is 
little distinction in evidence of food adulteration or injury result 
between cases where the Department of Justice has chosen to 
prosecute food safety executives and those cases where no 
criminal action has been taken.232  The one conclusion that can 
be drawn from all cases where the company executives were 
prosecuted is that all of those cases present evidence that the 
executive knew or should have known about circumstances that 
could have led to the cause of the food adulteration but chose to 
do nothing about it.233  In Jensen Farms, the brothers knew they 
should have been using the chlorine spray but chose not to 
implement the practice.234  In Quality Egg, the executives knew 
of the unsanitary conditions reported by investigators but took 
no action to remedy the problems.235  In Peanut Corporation of 
America, Mr. Parnell knew of the failing Salmonella test but 
chose to ship the products without confirmation that the 
shipment was Salmonella free.236  Each executive knew to some 
degree about the eventual cause of the outbreak.  Arguably each 
case could have been brought under a felony charge. 
On the other hand, the cases that have not been prosecuted, 
present clear evidence that each company distributed adulterated 
food in interstate commerce.237  In the Bidart Brothers case, the 
facility investigation even showed unsanitary conditions that led 
to the eventual outbreak, however, no charges were filed.238  As 
230.  Id. 
231.  Id. 
232.  See supra Sections II.A-B. 
233.  See Id.  
234.  See supra Section II.A.1. 
235.  See supra Section II.A.2. 
236.  See supra Section II.A.3. 
237.  See supra Section II.B.  
238.  See supra Section II.B.3. 
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a result, determining when food company executives will be 
prosecuted under the current statute is unpredictable even with 
the prosecutorial guidelines. 
III. HOW REMOVING THE STRICT LIABILITY
MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE FOR FOOD 
ADULTERATION CASES WOULD SATISFY THE 
FAIR WARNING REQUIREMENT OF THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE 
After reviewing the cases, it is clear the prosecutorial 
guidelines should remain in place. However, prosecution under 
the statute will be more just and predictable by eliminating the 
strict liability misdemeanor offense for food adulteration under 
the FDCA.  To explain how this would bring clear results, we 
will return to the Chipotle case one final time. 
In 2015, at least sixty consumers suffered illness across 
fourteen states resulting from E. coli contamination contracted 
after eating at Chipotle.239  Public Health officials have not been 
able to trace which specific ingredient caused the E. coli 
outbreak.240  Some experts assert that a contributing factor in the 
Chipotle outbreak may have been systemic failures in food 
handling, food preparation, and employee hygiene.241  
Nevertheless, under the responsible corporate officer doctrine, 
Chipotle CEO Steve Ells may be prosecuted because his 
company shipped adulterated food in interstate commerce.  The 
current statute for misdemeanor charges only requires that Mr. 
Ells be in a position of responsible relation to the company’s 
foodborne illness outbreak.242 
However, by eliminating the strict liability misdemeanor 
charge and leaving the felony charge requiring knowledge of the 
cause of the food adulteration, prosecutors would only be able to 
239.  See Beach, supra note 8. 
240.  Id. 
241.  Samantha Masunaga, What Went Wrong at Chipotle? Food Safety Expert 
Trevor Suslow Breaks It Down, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-qa-food-safety-20160317-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/LG34-SRG2]. 
242.  See supra Part I.D. 
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convict Mr. Ells if he knew that a company procedure or failure 
to implement a company procedure contributed to the 
company’s food product becoming contaminated with E. coli. 
This would properly punish executives for their actual 
wrongdoing.  The deterrence rationale would serve its purpose 
in criminalizing Mr. Ells’ actions.  However, this change would 
also protect unknowing CEOs, who were not aware that 
company practice or policies were resulting in adulterated food, 
from criminal prosecution and destruction of their professional 
careers.  Rest assured a foodborne illness outbreak of the type 
would still greatly impact the unknowing CEO.  Just ask Mr. 
Ells; suffering an 86 million dollar loss is a substantial 
punishment. 
CLAY D. SAPP 
